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HOFSTBA lAW REVIEW
Volume 24 Winter 1995
DAYS OF OUR LIVES: THE IMPACT OF SECTION
197 ON THE DEPRECIATION OF COPYRIGHTS,
PATENTS, AND RELATED PROPERTY
Mary LaFrance*
I. INTRODUCTION
For federal income tax purposes, owners of intangible property
generally must capitalize the costs of creating or acquiring that property.
In the past, the tax rules for recovering these capitalized costs through
depreciation' deductions varied greatly according to the nature of the
intangible. Certain types of acquired intangibles-notably, goodwill and
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. The author would
like to thank John Coverdale and Don Weidner for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
Article, Lori Berg, Mary Booth, Sharon Calix, and Charles Webb for their valuable research assis-
tance, Connie Clark and Joe Traina for their outstanding manuscript support, and the College of Law
for generously funding this research.
1. The term "depreciation" is used throughout this Article to refer to various methods of
accounting for the exhaustion of interests in filmed entertainment and similar assets. Although the
term "amortization" is often used in this context because many of these interests consist largely or
entirely of intangible property, see I.R.C. § 197 (1994), for tax purposes, interests in films, souid
recordings, or similar property are not always treated as intangibles. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 263A(b)
(1994) (for purposes of uniform capitalization rules, "'tangible personal property"' includes "a film,
sound recording, video tape, book, or similar property"); see also infra note 26 (discussing interests
in entertainment products as tangibles and intangibles). In fact, many of the assets discussed in this
Article consist of both tangible property (a film negative or prints, a phonorecord, a computer disk,
a CD-ROM, or a videocassette) and intangible property (copyright, contract, or trademark rights).
For these reasons, and for simplicity, only the term "depreciation" will be used here.
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going concern value-were nondepreciable. In contrast, taxpayers
purchasing interests in copyrights or patents could depreciate those assets
under the straight-line method or, in most cases, could opt for more rapid
cost recovery under the income forecast method.2
In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Congress
greatly enlarged the class of depreciable intangibles.3 The new rules,
which are codified in section 197 of the Internal Revenue Code,4 allow
taxpayers to depreciate virtually any intangible. Under certain circum-
stances, however, the new depreciation rules also apply to copyrights,
patents, and other forms of intellectual property that were already
depreciable under prior law. The effects of this change are particularly
acute when the intangible in question was previously eligible for the
income forecast method of depreciation, because the method prescribed
by section 197 spreads depreciation deductions over a fixed, continuous
recovery period, whereas the income forecast method allocates deprecia-
tion according to the actual income produced by the asset. Motion
pictures and sound recordings are two notable examples of assets affected
by these changes, although virtually any intangible property that derives
its value from a copyright or patent may feel the impact.
This Article explores the effect of section 197 on the depreciation
of property that was previously eligible for income forecast deprecia-
tion.5 It appears clear that in certain cases Congress intended to preserve
the availability of the income forecast method-for example, where a
taxpayer acquires an interest in a single unreleased motion picture or
sound recording, or an individual patent. In other cases, however,
Congress clearly intended section 197 to replace the income forecast
method-for example, where a taxpayer acquires an interest in a patent
or copyright in the course of acquiring the assets of an entire business.
In between these two clear-cut scenarios, however, there are many
2. See infra part III.
3. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13,261, 107 Stat.
312,532 (codified at 26 U.S.C § 197 (1994)). In general, the amendments apply to property acquired
after August 10, 1993. See id. § 13,261(g)(1), 107 Stat. at 540. But see id. § 13,261(g)(2)(A)-(g)(3),
107 Stat. at 540 (elections allowing limited retroactivity or "grandfathering" of binding contracts).
4. I.R.C. § 197 (1994). Unless otherwise indicated, all section references herein are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended to date ("I.R.C." or the "Code"), and the Treasury
Regulations thereunder.
5. The analysis and recommendations set forth in this Article with respect to income forecast
property would also apply to property that is depreciable under the "sliding scale" method which the
Tax Court approved in KIRO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 155, 170 (1968), acq. in result, 1974-2
C.B. 3. The sliding scale method is a specialized application of the income forecast method which
applies to television programming licenses. Id. at 159-60.
[V2ol. 24:317
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common situations in which the preemptive effect of section 197 is less
clear-for example, where a taxpayer acquires rights in a previously-
released film, or acquires several discrete assets in a single transaction,
such as a television series, a music catalog, a film library, or even a
group of patents.6 These uncertainties exist because the statute treats
copyrights, patents, and related interests differently according to whether
the intangible property is "acquired separately" or as part of an
acquisition of a substantial portion of a trade or business, and because the
legislative history suggests that a taxpayer will be found to have acquired
a substantial portion of a trade or business any time the transferred assets
include trademarks or other indicia of goodwill.7
Neither section 197 nor its legislative history adequately addresses
the large number of intellectual property-based products which contain
a substantial goodwill component even when they are acquired individu-
ally rather than as part of a going concern. In addition, the legislative
history cites simplicity of administration as the sole reason why patents,
copyrights, and related interests which were previously eligible for
income forecast depreciation are now rendered ineligible for that method
whenever they are acquired as a substantial part of a trade or business
rather than individually.8
Accordingly, this Article evaluates the impact of section 197 on
acquired interests in films, music, books, sound recordings, patents, and
other intellectual property-based assets that would otherwise be eligible
for income forecast depreciation. The Article observes that it can be
extremely difficult to determine whether a particular acquisition is subject
to section 197. In addition, mandating fifteen-year straight-line deprecia-
tion for assets that otherwise could be depreciated under the income
forecast method may lead to a mismatching of the income and expense
related to those assets.9 The Article concludes by recommending that the
income forecast method be reinstated for acquired interests in patents,
copyrights, and other eligible property without regard to whether, in a
particular case, those interests are deemed to be "acquired separately."
6. This problem would arise even if the group of assets transferred included only one
intangible. For example, acquiring a single patent along with tangible plant and equipment could
present the same problem because the patent might not be treated as "acquired separately" for
purposes of the exclusion from the definition of § 197 intangibles. See I.RC. § 197(e)(4) (1994).
7. See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
9. See Michael J. Douglass, Tangible Results for Intangible Assets: An Analysis of New Code
Section 197, 47 TAx LAW. 713, 752-55 (1994) (arguing that this mismatching is preferable to
providing multiple amortization periods).
1995]
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II. PURPOSE AND HISTORY OF SECTION 197
Congress enacted section 197 in order to simplify the rules for
depreciating intangibles and to reduce the number of controversies arising
from the need to determine which intangibles are depreciable and what
their recovery periods should be. l0 The statute achieves these goals by
imposing the fifteen-year straight-line method on most acquired
intangibles. In general, before section 197 was enacted, the capitalized
cost of an acquired intangible was depreciable only when the taxpayer
could establish that the asset was distinct from goodwill or going concern
value and had a limited and ascertainable useful life.1I The vagueness
of this standard led to frequent administrative appeals and litigation. 2
10. See Tax Treatment of Intangible Assets: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1991) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Chairman
Rostenkowski); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 690, 696 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1379, 1385 (purpose of§ 197 "is to simplify the law regarding the amortization
of intangibles"); H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 760 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 991; H.R. REP. No. 631, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 210 (1992); S. REP. No. 300,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (1992). For cases exemplifying the controversy on this issue, see
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993); Citizens & Southern Corp.
v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463 (1988), affd, 919 F.2d 1492 (11 th Cir. 1990). See generally Allen
walbum, Comment, Depreciation of Intangibles: An Area of the Tax Law in Need of Change, 30
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 453, 456 & n.12 (1993) (noting that main purpose of § 197 was to reduce
controversy and litigation).
11. See Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1672 & n.l, 1675; Ralph W. Fullerton Co. v.
United States, 550 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977); Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States,
481 F.2d 1240, 1247 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974); Citizens & Southern, 91
T.C. at 492-93; Concord Control, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1345, 1357 (1976)
(holding that purchase price allocable to going concern value was nondepreciable), aff'd, 615 F.2d
1153 (6th Cir. 1980); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960); Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2 C.B. 65. See
generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 102D CONG., IST SESs., DESCRIPTION OF
PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF CERTAIN INTANGIBLE
PROPERTY (H.R. 3035, H.R. 1456, & H.R. 563) 5 (Comm. Print 1991) [hereinafter DESCRIPTION OF
PROPOSALS] (describing these restrictions on depreciation of an acquired intangible asset).
12. See, e.g., Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. 1670. See generally House Hearings, supra
note 10, at 29, 44, 49 (statements of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy Kenneth W.
Gideon and Internal Revenue Service Commissioner Fred T. Goldberg); id. at 75 (statement of GAO
Director for Tax Policy and Administrative Issues Jennie S. Stathis); H.R. REP. NO. 111, supra note
10, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 991; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 102D CONG., 2D
SESS., PRESENT LAW AND PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF THE
COST OF ACQUIRING GOODWILL AND CERTAIN OTHER INTANGIBLES 4-17 (Comm. Print 1992)
[hereinafter PRESENT LAW AND PROPOSALS]; DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at 5-18;
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TAX
POLICY: ISSUES AND POLICY PROPOSALS REGARDING TAX TREATMENT OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS 20-
30 (GAO/GGD-91-88 1991) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; Jane G. Gravelle & Jack Taylor, Taxing
Intangibles: An Economic Analysis, at CRS-2 (Congressional Research Service Report for Congress)
[Vol. 24:317
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Whereas copyrights and patents have ascertainable useful lives, 3
in most cases unpatented inventions, trademarks, trade names, and
franchises are deemed to have indeterminate useful lives and, prior to
section 197, were generally found to be nondepreciable (subject to
limited statutory exceptions). 4
(October 25, 1991); James A. Doering, The Amortization of Intangibles: Before and After Section
197, 71 TAXES 621, 622-23 (1993); Douglass, supra note 9, 713-25.
13. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960); Rev. Rul. 67-136, 1967-1 C.B. 58, 59; see also Kraft
Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 513, 591-93 (1954), rev'don other grounds, 232 F.2d 118 (2d
Cir. 1956); PRESENT LAW AND PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at 13; DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSALS, supra
note 11, at 13-14 (noting that useful life of patent or copyright may be shorter than its statutory
term).
14. See Clarke v. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384,386-87 (1930) (holding
goodwill of brewery nondepreciable); Renziehausen v. Lucas, 280 U.S. 387,388-89 (1930) (goodwill
of whiskey distilling company nondepreciable); Georator Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 283, 286-
87 (4th Cir. 1973) (cost of protecting trademark from cancellation must be capitalized), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 945 (1974), abrogation recognized by NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th
Cir. 1982); J. Strickland & Co. v. United States, 352 F.2d 1016, 1017, 1019 (6th Cir. 1965) (no
royalty deduction allowed when payments were held to be for the purchase of trademarks), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 950 (1966); Danskin, Inc. v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 360,361 (2d Cir. 1964) (cost
of trademark infringement litigation must be capitalized); Buddy Schoellkopf Prods., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 640, 648 (1975) (legal fees attributed to acquiring trademarks, trade names,
and goodwill must be capitalized); Toledo TV Cable Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 1107, 1117,
1125 (1971) (denying depreciation deductions for cable television franchises because taxpayer could
not establish determinable useful life), affidper curiam, 483 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1973); Stiles v.
Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 501, 505 (1967) (cost of acquiring trade name is nondepreciable);
Stuart Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 585, 590-91 (1950) (cost of acquiring trademark must
be capitalized), affd, 195 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1952); Rainier Brewing Co. v. Commissioner, 7 T.C.
162, 169-70 (1946) (cost of acquiring exclusive and perpetual trademark license must be capitalized),
aff'd, 165 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1948); Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 856,
873 (1946) (cost of acquiring trade name must be capitalized), afJ'd, 165 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1948);
Mrs. Franklin Shops, Inc. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 401,403-04 (1944) (cost of acquiring
goodwill must be capitalized); Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 326, 328-31
(1934) (acquired trademarks are nondepreciable); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A.
1333, 1335 (1927) (capitalized cost of acquiring exclusive franchise of unlimited duration is
nondepreciable); see also Dobson v. United States, 551 F. Supp. 1152, 1154-55 (Cl. Ct. 1982)
(holding that patents and copyrights are depreciable because they have ascertainable value separate
from goodwill, and have limited useful lives, but a franchise agreement was not depreciable where
it lacked ascertainable value separate from trademarks and goodwill and lacked limited useful life);
Herrick v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 237, 266 (1985) (before enactment of § 1253, cost of acquiring
franchise was depreciable only if it had ascertainable useful life); Chronicle Publishing Co. v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C. 964, 985-86 (1977) (allowing depreciation where taxpayer established useful
lives for cable television franchises), nonacq., 1980-1 C.B. 2; S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
210 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2245 (stating that franchises typically had
indeterminate useful lives, with some exceptions); Treas. Reg. § 1. 167(a)-3 (1960); Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1253-1(c)(2), 36 Fed. Reg. 13,148 (1971) (withdrawn by CO-53-92, 58 Fed. Reg. 25,587, as
modified by IRS correction issued March 21, 1994). See generally PRESENT LAW AND PROPOSALS,
supra note 12, at 10-11 (noting that, apart from § 1253, the cost of acquiring a trademark, trade
name, or franchise was not depreciable, where the asset could not be distinguished from goodwill
1995]
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There has generally been less controversy over depreciation of
taxpayer-produced (or "self-created") intangibles. In some cases, the cost
of creating such intangibles is expensed-for example, where they reflect
advertising expenses used to generate goodwill,"5 or training costs used
to enhance the value of workforce in place,'6 or where a taxpayer elects
to deduct research and development expenditures under section 174.17
In other cases, creation costs must be capitalized--for example, the
or where it lacked a determinate useful life); DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at I1
(similar).
The enactment of § 1253 allowed the cost of certain acquired trademarks, trade names, and
franchises to be recovered through annual deductions. When a trademark, trade name, or franchise
is sold for serial payments contingent on the use, productivity, or disposition of the asset, the
payments are typically deductible as trade or business expenses. I.R.C. § 1253(d) (1994). Before
enactment of § 197, § 1253 permitted 10- and 25-year amortization under certain other circumstanc-
es. Id. § 1253(d)(2), (3) (before amendment by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-66, § 13,261(c), 107 Stat. 532, 539 (codified at 26 U.S.C § 197 (1994))). In all other
cases, the cost of acquiring a trademark, trade name, or franchise must be capitalized. I.R.C.
§ 1253(d)(2) (1994); see DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at 11-12 (discussing § 1253);
Rev. Rul. 74-302, 1974-1 C.B. 238 (applying § 1253). Annual licensing fees remain deductible under
I.R.C. § 162 (1994).
Before § 197 was enacted, the costs of acquiring unpatented inventions, trade secrets, and
other types of "know-how" were generally treated as nondepreciable because the assets' useful lives
were deemed to be indeterminate, like goodwill. See Kaltenbach v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 581,
587-88 (1929); Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 253, 256 (S.D. Ind. 1958);
Graham v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 853, 859 (1981); Yates Indus. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 961,
973-34 (1972), affid without opinion, 480 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1973); Burde v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.
252, 269-70 (1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 966 (1966); Hershey
Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 867, 876-77 (1928), modified, 43 F.2d 298 (10th Cir. 1930);
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960). But see Liquid Paper Corp. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 284, 299
(1983) (holding that where formula has determinable useful life, it is depreciable); Best Lock Corp.
v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1217, 1234 (1959) (allowing annual depreciation deduction with respect
to patent applications where deduction reflects annual payment contractually fixed as a percentage
of annual earnings derived from patent application); Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 513,
591-93 (1954) (allowing depreciation of patent applications), rev'd on other grounds, 232 F.2d 118
(2d Cir. 1956); Rev. Rul. 67-136, 1967-1 C.B. 58, 59 (similar).
15. See Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57 (reiterating rule that advertising expenses are
deductible under § 162 even though they may create benefits that extend substantially beyond the
current taxable year).
16. See, e.g., Knoxville Iron Co. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C.M. (CCH) 251,263 (1959) (holding
that personnel training costs were deductible when incurred); DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSALS, supra
note 11, at 18.
17. The taxpayer can elect to expense research costs relating to creation of patents and "similar
property" (excluding "literary, historical, or similar projects") if they are incurred in connection with
"his trade or business." I.R.C. § 174(a)(1) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(2) (as amended in 1994).
See DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at 18 n.60; Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2 (as amended in
1994); Rev. Rul. 73-20, 1973-1 C.B. 133; Rev. Rul. 71-162, 1971-1 C.B. 97; Rev. Rul. 68-471,
1968-2 C.B. 109; Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303 (applying § 174 to computer software).
[Vol. 24:317
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creation costs of most copyrights"8 and any creation costs of patents that
are not deducted under section 174.19 In the case of taxpayer-created
copyrights and patents, just as in the case of acquired patents and
copyrights, capitalized costs are depreciable.2" In contrast, in the case
of a trademark, trade name, or franchise, creation costs that are ineligible
for expensing must generally be capitalized,2 but prior to section 197's
enactment, these capitalized costs were typically treated as nondeprecia-
ble.2"
Section 197 does not change the rules dictating whether the cost of
creating or acquiring a particular intangible asset should be capitalized
or expensed. However, it does change the rules for determining whether,
and by what method, any of the capitalized costs can be depreciated.23
18. I.R.C. § 263A (1994); Treas. Regs. § 1.263A-2(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1994); see also
DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at 18 & n.59. Section 263A(h) provides a limited
exemption from the capitalization rules for "qualified creative expense[s]" of individual free-lance
writers, photographers, and artists. I.R.C. § 263A(h) (1994). The law is currently unclear whether
§ 195 (provising a 5-year amortization for start-up costs of a trade or business) can be applied to the
cost of creating certain copyrights and patents. I.RC. § 195 (1994); see Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-18-001
(Jan. 12, 1989); Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-27-002 (Mar. 6, 1990) revising Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-18-001).
19. See Treas. Reg. § 1.174-4(a)(4) (1960). The applicability of § 195 to patents is unclear.
See supra note 18.
20. See I.RC. §§ 167,263,263A (1994); Hazeltine Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 513, 520-
21 (3d Cir. 1937); Fenis v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 937, 939 (1968); Claude Neon Lights,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 424, 427-28 (1937), acq. in part, 1937-2 C.B. 5; In re Beaumont
Co., 3 B.T.A. 822, 823 (1926); In re Gilliam Mfg. Co., I B.T.A. 967, 970 (1925), acq., 1925-2 C.B.
2; Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-6(a) (1960).
Taxpayers creating patents or similar property can spread the research costs over 60 months.
I.R.C. § 174(b)(I) (1994); see Treas. Reg. § 1.174-4(a)(4) (1960); see also Red Star Yeast & Prods.
Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 321, 340-43 (1955) (holding that a taxpayer not using § 174 must
capitalize patent development costs), acq., 1956-2 C.B. 7. Shorter periods are allowable for software.
See infra note 41.
21. I.R.C. §§ 162(a), 263(a)(1), 263A (1994); Idaho Power Co. v. Commissioner, 418 U.S. 1
(1974); Boylston Market Ass'n v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1942); Rev. Rul. 55-518,
1955-1 C.B. 319 (requiring capitalization of trademark filing costs); Rev. Rul. 89-23, 1989-1 C.B.
85 (package design costs must be capitalized).
22. Id. § 263; Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960); Rev. Rul. 89-23, 1989-1 C.B. 85 (capitalized
package design costs were nondepreciable because useful life of design was indeterminate). Costs
incurred in creating or defending a trademark were formerly depreciable under § 177, which was
repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 241(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2181. See,
e.g., Georator Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 283, 285-86 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
945 (1974), abrogation recognized by NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982);
see also Rev. Rul. 79-333, 1979-2 C.B. 110 (legal fees incurred in infringement proceedings were
amortizable under § 177 so long as taxpayer made timely election).
23. At times it may be difficult to determine whether a particular asset (such as a cartoon
figure or musical jingle) is primarily a copyright or primarily a trademark. The latter is always
subject to § 197, even when self-created, while a self-created copyright is not. However, § 197 itself
did not create this uncertainty. See infra note 76 (discussing interests in copyrighted works acquired
1995]
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Section 197 now allows taxpayers to depreciate the capitalized cost of
virtually any intangible-including such formerly nondepreciable assets
as goodwill, going concern value, franchises, trademarks, and trade
names-whether created or purchased by the taxpayer.2 4 It thus reduces
the number of situations in which it is necessary to determine the useful
life of a particular intangible, and diminishes the incentive taxpayers once
had to characterize acquired intangibles as assets distinguishable from
goodwill and going concern value.
As discussed in Part IV, however, in many cases section 197
requires taxpayers to depreciate all intangibles acquired in a single
transaction under the fifteen-year straight-line method, even though some
of those intangibles, if acquired separately, would have been eligible for
alternative depreciation methods. Although lumping these intangibles
together for depreciation purposes does provide for simplicity of
administration, in certain cases this causes a mismatching of income and
expense by imposing a recovery period that does not correspond to the
asset's useful life, and by requiring depreciation to be spread evenly over
a fixed recovery period even where the associated income stream varies
significantly from one year to the next.25 This is particularly true of
those intangibles, such as copyrights and patents, which would otherwise
be eligible for income forecast depreciation. In addition, the lack of
guidance for determining when such an intangible is "acquired separate-
ly" reintroduces some of the complexity which section 197 was supposed
to eliminate.
III. DEPRECIATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER THE
INCOME FORECAST METHOD
As discussed in Part II, before enactment of section 197, certain
intellectual property interests, including copyrights and patents, were
depreciable even though other intangibles,26 such as goodwill and going
in part for their merchandising value).
24. See I.R.C. § 197(a), (d)(l) (1994).
25. See Douglass, supra note 9, at 752-55.
26. Although interests in motion pictures, television films, videotapes, and master sound
recordings are treated as intangibles in § 197, courts have treated them as tangibles for purposes of
the investment tax credit ("ITC"). See. e.g., EMI N. Am. Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 675 F.2d
1068, 1069 (9th Cir. 1982) (master sound recordings qualify for ITC); Bing Crosby Prods., Inc. v.
United States, 588 F.2d 1293, 1299 (9th Cir. 1979) (similar); Walt Disney Prods. v. United States,
549 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1976) (master negatives of feature films qualify for ITC). Congress
eventually resolved the conflict with an express provision making only "qualified films" eligible for
the ITC. I.R.C. § 48(k) (1988) (repealed); Treas. Reg. § 1.A8-8 (1988) (removed by T.D. 8474, 58
[Vol. 24:317
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concern value, were not. In fact, copyrights and patents have long been
eligible for particularly rapid depreciation under the income forecast
method whenever the asset in question produces higher income in its
early years of exploitation than in later years. Over time the government
has extended this method to a wide variety of copyright-based products,
such as motion pictures, books, and sound recordings.
The income forecast method works as follows: During each year
that an asset is used in income-producing activities, the taxpayer recovers
a fraction of its basis (less its estimated salvage value)." That fraction
is derived from the following calculation: The taxpayer must estimate in
advance the gross income which the asset will generate for the taxpayer
during its lifetime. Then, in each taxable year, the taxpayer can deduct
a percentage of the capitalized cost which corresponds to the percentage
of the estimated lifetime income generated during that year. Thus, for a
given taxable year, the numerator of the income forecast fraction is the
income actually received by the taxpayer from exploiting the asset during
that year, and the denominator is the estimated total income to be derived
Fed. Reg. 25,556, April 27, 1993). For purposes of the uniform capitalization rules, films, sound
recordings, books, videotapes, and "other similar property embodying words, ideas, concepts, images
or sounds" are treated as tangibles. Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-2(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1994); see I.R.C.
§ 263A(b) (1994).
For depreciation purposes, there is some uncertainty over whether films (or interests therein)
are tangible assets. Courts have never reached agreement. See, e.g., DiPiero v. Commissioner, 57
T.C.M. (CCH) 71, 79-80 (1989) (treating film as tangible, but right to participate in gross receipts
as intangible); Madden v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CC-I) 84, 91 (1989) (same); Walt Disney, 549
F.2d at 580 (noting that taxpayer depreciated its films under income forecast method---a scheme
generally used for depreciating intangible personal property"--without deciding whether taxpayer's
characterization was correct). In a 1979 Revenue Ruling and a 1978 General Counsel Memorandum
("GCM"), the IRS took the position that films and similar property are intangibles for depreciation
purposes. Rev. Rul. 79-285, 1979-2 C.B. 91 (disapproving use of sliding scale method for
depreciation of manuscripts); Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,800 (Dec. 27, 1978) (similar). In the accelerated
cost recovery system ("ACRS") rules of § 168, Congress implicitly treated motion pictures and
videotapes as tangible property when it listed them as exceptions to the general rule that ACRS was
applicable to "any tangible property." I.R.C. § 168(a), (0(3) (1994); see Comshare, Inc. v. United
States, 27 F.3d 1142, 1146-47 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that "tangible personal property" has an
expansive meaning in the Code, encompassing motion pictures and television films).
In the copyright context, of course, the intangibles contained in films and other entertainment
products are distinguished from their tangible aspects. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1994) (distinguishing
ownership of copyright from ownership of physical object in which it is embedded).
27. The salvage value would depend on whether the taxpayer normally disposes of a film while
it still has substantial value or exploits each film until its commercial potential is exhausted. See Rev.
Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68, 69-70.
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from the asset during its useful life.2' The estimated total income is
based on the conditions existing at the end of the year to which the
depreciation deduction applies. If these conditions change, so that the
original expectations prove inaccurate, any over-or under-estimates of the
asset's total income stream can be corrected by changing the denominator
of the fraction in each year that an error becomes apparent.29
The Treasury first authorized the use of the income forecast method
for "television films, taped shows for reproduction, and other property of
a similar character." 30  In that ruling, the government reasoned that
time-based depreciation methods--such as the straight-line meth-
od-would not clearly reflect the income associated with such assets. A
successful film, for example, might continue to produce substantial
revenue over a number of years, while an unsuccessful one might
produce little or no revenue after its initial year of service. The ruling did
not distinguish between the intangible and tangible components of the
assets, nor did it distinguish between ownership of all the rights in a
particular asset and ownership of limited exploitation rights such as a
license or profit participation.
Subsequent rulings approved the income forecast method for other
28. Algebraically, the formula can be expressed as follows:
D = (C-S) x YfT
T = total anticipated income from the asset
Y = income from the asset during Year X
C = asset's cost
S = asset's salvage value
D = depreciation allowable for Year X
29. Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68, 69; see Bailey v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 558, 619-21
(1988) (describing income forecast method as applied to profit participations in motion pictures),
aff'd in part and vacated in part, 912 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1990). Estimated salvage value can also be
altered as conditions change. See Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68, 69-70.
Rev. Rul. 60-358 defined the "income" to be included in the denominator of the income
forecast fraction as "the forecasted or estimated total income to be derived from the films during
their useful life, including estimated income from foreign exhibition or other exploitation of such
films... less the expense of distributing the films, not including depreciation." Id. at 69.
However, according to a subsequent interpretation by the IRS, this income stream is not as
all-inclusive as the language of the Revenue Ruling would suggest. Certain sources of income that
are deemed "speculative" are excluded from the income forecast fraction until there is greater
certainty that they will be realized. See Rev. Proc. 71-29, 1971-2 C.B. 569, 569 (ruling that income
from certain secondary markets for motion picture films and television films and series could be
excluded from income forecast formula as too speculative). Although merchandising revenues may
represent a substantial portion of the income stream of certain income forecast properties-motion
pictures and television films, in particular--the IRS takes the position that merchandising income
should be completely excluded from the income forecast calculation. Tech. Adv. Mem. 79-18-012
(Jan. 24, 1979).
30. Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68, 70.
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intellectual property-based products, including theatrical motion
pictures,3 books,32 patents,33 master sound recordings,34 musical
compositions, 3  rental videocassettes, 36  and most recently, video
games. 37 The Tax Court has repeatedly endorsed the use of the income
forecast method for films, finding that it produces a clear reflection of
income.38 Courts have also approved the method for certain interests
that constitute less than full ownership of one of these assets-for
example, a contractual right to participate in the gross receipts or net
profits of a motion picture.39 The rationale of these authorities suggests
that the method should be appropriate for other categories of depreciable
property which generate an income stream so uneven that the passage of
time is not the best measure of the property's usage.4" Thus, the list of
property eligible for income forecast depreciation could continue to
31. Rev. Rul. 64-273, 1964-2 C.B. 62, 62; accord H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
914-15 (1985), reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. 914, 914-15.
32. Rev. Rul. 79-285, 1979-2 C.B. 91, 92.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-01-006 (Sept. 24, 1984) (noting that the ruling is limited to
copyrighted musical compositions which "generate an uneven flow of income similar to that
described in Rev. Rul. 60-358").
36. Rev. Rul. 89-62, 1989-1 C.B. 78, 79.
37. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-23-007 (March 8, 1993).
38. See Abramson v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 360, 376-78 (1986); Greene v. Commissioner,
81 T.C. 132, 135 (1983); Wildman v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 943, 950-51 (1982); Siegel v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 659,692 (1982), acq., 1984-2 C.B. 2,3; Schneider v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.
18, 32-33 (1975), acq., 1976-2 C.B. 2; see also Carland, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 505, 544-45
(1988) (discussing rationale of these cases, and distinguishing cases involving depreciation of
tangible property), affid in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 909 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir. 1990).
39. See Upham v. Commissioner, 923 F.2d 1328, 1335 (8th Cir. 1991); Evans v. Commis-
sioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2917,2920 (1991); Green v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1333, 1350
(1989); DiPiero v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 71, 79 (1989); Madden v. Commissioner, 57
T.C.M. (CCH) 84, 91 (1989); Bailey v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 558, 608 (1988), affd in part and
vacated in part, 912 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1990); Schwartz v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 11, 25
(1987), aff'd without opinion, 930 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1991) (reported in full at 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 7415 (9th Cir. Apr. 19, 1991)); Garner v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 824, 836 (1987);
Law v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1065, 1104 n.24 (1986); Durkin v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1329,
1369 (1986), aft'd, 872 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 824 (1989); Rev. Rul. 77-125,
1977-1 C.B. 130, 131-32.
40. See Rev. Rul. 79-285, 1979-2 C.B. 91, 92. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-23-007 (Mar. 8, 1993) notes
that:
[A]ssets ... for which use of the income forecast method has been approved, have the
following attributes in common: (1) the physical life of the asset is largely irrelevant to
its income producing ability; (2) each asset has unique income-producing ability; and (3)
the useful life of the asset is measured in terms of its income producing ability.
Id.; see Rev. Rul. 77-125, 1977-1 C.B. 130, 131-32; Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68, 68 (as
amplified by Rev. Rul. 64-273, 1964-2 C.B. 62).
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expand as new forms of intellectual property are developed.41 Subject
to the limits now imposed by section 197, the income forecast method
applies to both self-created and acquired depreciable assets.
Other than the income forecast method, depreciation methods which
allow accelerated deductions in the early years of an asset's useful life
are generally inapplicable to patents,42 copyrights, or similar assets
which, although tangible in some respects, derive their value largely from
patents or copyrights. Examples include interests in motion pictures,
television films, videotapes, and sound recordings.43 Such assets are
ineligible for accelerated depreciation, and must therefore be depreciated
under the straight-line method unless the taxpayer can establish the
reasonableness of another method, such as the income forecast
method.' For many, if not most, taxpayers, the income forecast method
41. Although the income forecast method would seem appropriate for computer software, that
application is statutorily barred. Section 197 applies to acquired software that is customized,
exclusively licensed, unavailable to the general public, or acquired in a transaction that involves the
acquisition of assets constituting a substantial portion of a trade or business. I.R.C. § 197(e)(3)(A)
(1994). Other newly acquired software is subject to three-year depreciation. Id. § 167(f)(l)-(2); H.R.
REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 767; S. REP No. 36, 103d Cong., 1st sess. 226 (1993). Before § 197
was enacted, software could be depreciated over five years or less. See Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2
C.B. 303.
42. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1218, 1225 (1975);
Newton Insert Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 570, 586-89 (1974), aff'd, 545 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir.
1976); Hershey Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 867, 876-77 (1928), modified on other
grounds, 43 F.2d 298 (10th Cir. 1930); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-6(a) (1960); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(c)-i
(as amended in 1994); Rev. Rul. 79-285, 1979-2 C.B. 91, 92; Rev. Rul. 67-136, 1967-1 C.B. 58, 59.
43. See I.R.C. § 168(f)(3)-(4) (1994) (specifically excepting films, videotapes, and sound
recordings from depreciation under the accelerated cost recovery system); id. § 167(c) (requiring
straight-line method for films, videotapes, and sound recordings), repealed as deadwood by Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11,812(a)(1), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-534
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 167 (1994)); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 964, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 1142 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2347, 2847 (repealing certain "deadwood"
provisions of 1986 Internal Revenue Code). See generally I.R.C. § 167(a) (1994) (providing general
rule allowing depreciation of property); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-l(a) (1960) (discussing the straight
line method in general); Rev. Rul. 89-62, 1989-1 C.B. 78, 79 (discussing proper method of
depreciating videocassettes).
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-l(a) (1960). In the case of certain film rights licensed for a limited
number of television showings (rather than a limited period of time with unlimited showings), the
Tax Court has approved use of a variation on the income forecast method known as the "sliding
scale" method. Under this method, the licensee can allocate depreciation on a graduated basis, with
greater amounts allocated to the earlier showings, reflecting the fact that the earlier showings are
worth a larger portion of the license fee than the later showings. See KIRO, Inc. v. Commissioner,
51 T.C. 155, 170-74 (1968), acq. in result, 1974-2 C.B. 3. In other cases, this method has been
disallowed in favor of a more standard application of the income forecast method. See Schwartz v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 11, 25-26 (1987) (disallowing sliding scale method where
partnership owned only a contractual right to participate in film's gross receipts after recoupment
of production costs), aff'd without opinion, 930 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1991) (reported in full at 1991
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is the only means available to achieve faster cost recovery.45
U.S. App. LEXIS 7415 (9th Cir. Apr. 19, 1991)); Garner v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 824,
836 (1987) (where taxpayer acquired television programs, court found no evidence that the number
of authorized television broadcasts was limited and no evidence that advertising revenues diminished
for rebroadcasts); see also Rev. Rul. 79-285, 1979-2 C.B. 91, 92 (disallowing sliding scale method
where taxpayer purchased all rights to book manuscript, patent, and master recording).
At one time the income forecast method was the only depreciation method available for
motion pictures and certain other properties. Embodied in former § 280, this rule was aimed at
certain motion picture tax shelters. See Law v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1065, 1104 n.24 (1986);
Estate of Helliwell v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 964, 990-91 (1981); S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 9, 71-79 (1976).
Other than the income forecast method and the sliding-scale method, the straight-line method
is the only method available for depreciating motion pictures, videotapes, master sound recordings,
and similar copyright-based properties. See Green v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1333, 1350
(1989) (upholding Commissioner's decision that taxpayer must switch from declining balance
method to income forecast method for motion picture); DiPiero v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH)
71, 83 (1989) (holding that "straight-line method is applicable to intangible properties"); Madden
v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M (CCH) 84, 95 (1989) (declining balance method unavailable for
contractual right to participate in film's gross receipts, while straight line method would be
appropriate); Law, 86 T.C. at 1103 (holding that either straight-line or income forecast method may
be used to depreciate contractual right to participate in film's gross receipts and that the declining
balance method is unavailable for intangibles); Inter-City Television Film Corp. v. Commissioner,
43 T.C. 270, 292 (1964) (cost recovery method unacceptable for television films and film rights);
Rev. Rul. 89-62, 1989-1 C.B. 78, 79 (accelerated depreciation unavailable for rental videotapes;
taxpayer must use straight-line or income forecast method); Rev. Rul. 67-379, 1967-2 C.B. 127, 129
(baseball players' contracts are ineligible for accelerated depreciation); Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2
C.B. 68, 68 (as amplified by, Rev. Rul. 64-273, 1964-2 C.B. 62) (cost recovery method unacceptable
and income forecast acceptable for television films and film rights); Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-02-004
(Sept. 28, 1977) (accelerated depreciation unavailable for motion pictures and television films
because they are intangibles, even though treated as tangibles for purposes of investment tax credit);
see also I.R.C. § 168(f)(1)(B) (1994) (making accelerated depreciation unavailable for any property
which, in its first year of use by the taxpayer, "is properly depreciated under.., any method of
depreciation not expressed in a term of years'). Prior to 1986, certain sound recordings were eligible
for accelerated depreciation under ACRS. I.R.C. § 48(r)(1) (1982); Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 113(c)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 635 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 48 (1994)).
45. In general, the income forecast method is beneficial to taxpayers seeking rapid recovery
of their film production or acquisition costs. This is because the largest part of a film's income
stream typically occurs in the early years of its release. See HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT
INDUSTRY ECONOMICs 73 (2d ed. 1990); see also Durkin v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 1271, 1277-78
(7th Cir.) (discussing typical time frames for theatrical, videocassette, and television release), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 824 (1989). Unless a film produces little or no revenue in its early years, the
income forecast method will provide faster basis recovery than the straight-line method.
Under the straight-line method, a film's costs are deducted over its useful life, defined as the
period during which the asset may reasonably be expected to be useful in the taxpayer's income-
producing activity. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-l(b) (1972). Few films are depreciated under this
method. See SCHUYLER M. MOORE, THE FILMED ENTERTAINMENT INDUsTRY 403.021 (Lawrence
M. Stone ed., 1990). The salvage value of filmed entertainment may be reduced by 10% of basis,
which for many films effectively eliminates salvage value from the straight-line calculation. Treas.
Reg. § 1.167(a)-I(c) (1972).
In terms of years, the useful life of a film is difficult to predict with accuracy. Although
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IV. THE IMPACT OF SECTION 197 ON PREVIOUSLY
DEPRECIABLE INTANGIBLES
When a particular intangible falls within the scope of section 197,
it is now subject to straight-line depreciation over a fifteen-year period,
regardless of the property's anticipated income stream or useful life. 6
With respect to any intangible which generates most of its income early
in its useful life, such as a motion picture or other intellectual property-
based asset, the preclusion of the income forecast method could have
significant tax consequences.
Section 197 applies to specified categories of intangibles that are
held in connection with a trade or business or other income-producing
activity,47  including, among others,41 goodwill,49  copyrights, ° pat-
ents," and "similar item[s],"52 certain computer software, 53 covenants
taxpayers have been known to use shorter lives, lives of 5-12 years appear to be typical. See Bailey
v. Commissioner, 993 F.2d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting Tax Court's finding of 10-year useful
life); Upham v. Commissioner, 923 F.2d 1328, 1336 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding Tax Court
determination of eight-year useful life, and noting expert testimony that a film released in 1981 could
be expected to produce revenues for about 12 years); Durkin, 872 F.2d at 1278 (upholding tax
court's finding of six-year useful life). See generally MOORE, supra (collecting authorities). One
commentator reports that film limited partnerships have sometimes used a four-year life, reasoning
that revenues which accrue after four years are so speculative that they would have been excluded
from the anticipated revenue stream under the income forecast method. Id. For a discussion of
amounts excluded from estimated lifetime revenues under the income forecast method, see supra
note 29. But see Durkin, 872 F.2d at 1278 (rejecting four-year useful life claimed by taxpayer).
In some cases, the straight-line method will benefit a taxpayer more than the income forecast
method. If the taxpayer receives no income from the film during a given year (for example, if
distribution expenses equal or exceed gross receipts), the income forecast method allows no
depreciation deduction for that year. See. e.g., Fox Park Corp. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH)
917, 922 (1985). This is occasionally a problem even for a relatively successful film, if the taxpayer
reports on the cash method and encounters difficulty in collecting receipts. See, e.g., Gordon v.
Commissioner, 766 F.2d 293, 298 (7th Cir. 1985); Wildman v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 943, 951
(1982); Rev. Rul. 78-28, 1978-1 C.B. 61, 61. If a film never generates any net income after
distribution expenses, the straight-line method allows no depreciation deductions at all, and the
taxpayer can recover the asset's basis only by selling or abandoning the property.
46. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13,261, 107 Stat.
312, 532. The new rules generally apply to any acquisitions after August 10, 1993. Id.
§ 13,261(g)(1), 107 Stat. at 540.
47. I.R.C. § 197(c)(1)(B) (1994).
48. See id. § 197(d)(1) (defining "section 197 intangible").
49. Id. § 197(d)(1)(A).
50. Id. § 197(d)(1)(C)(iii).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 10, at 679-80, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 1368-69. Compare I.R.C. § 197(d)(1)(C)(ii)-(iii) (1994) (referring to "operating systems" and
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not to compete,54 and "any franchise, trademark, or trade name."55
Because section 197 is mandatory rather than elective, any property to
which it applies cannot be depreciated under an alternative method such
as the income forecast method even if the alternative approach would,
from an economic perspective, provide a clearer reflection of income.
Certain intangibles fall within section 197 regardless of whether they
are acquired or self-created 56-for example, trademarks, trade names,
and franchises.57 Others are subject to section 197 only when they are
acquired rather than self-created. Within this latter group, certain
acquired intangibles are subject to section 197 regardless of how they are
"any... copyright, formula, process. . . or other similar item") with id. § 197(e)(3) (excluding
certain types of "computer software"). Section 197(e)(3)(A)(i) implies that the term "computer
software" refers not only to the entire underlying copyright (or an exclusive interest therein) but also
to the limited license to use the software once a copy is lawfully acquired. In each case, the intangi-
ble interest embodied in the software or the license to use it is a form of copyright interest. See H.R.
CONF. REtP. No. 213, supra note 10, at 680, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1369 (defining
"computer software" as a "sequence of machine-readable code ... includ[ing] any incidental or
ancillary rights" connected with ownership or use of the software, but excluding proprietary data).
Because copyrights and patents are subject to the "acquired separately" rules, I.R.C. § 197(e)(4)(C)
(1994), this makes part of the statutory language regarding software redundant, id. § 197(e)(3)(A)(ii)
(exempting "software which is not acquired in a transaction" involving a substantial portion of a
trade or business), and makes part of the statutory language contradictory. Compare id.
§ 197(e)(3)(A)(i) (exempting certain software regardless of whether it is acquired in a trade or
business acquisition) with id. § 197(d)(1)(C)(iii), (e)(4)(C) (exempting copyrights only when
"acquired separately'). This suggests that Congress intended to treat certain software copyrights more
liberally than other copyrights acquired as part of a trade or business. This liberal treatment applies
only to software "which is readily available for purchase by the general public, is subject to a
nonexclusive license, and has not been substantially modified." Id. § 197(e)(3)(A)(i).
54, Id. § 197(d)(1)(E).
55. Id. § 197(d)(l)(F). Hereinafter, the terms "trademark" and "mark" will be used in this
Article to refer to both common-law and federally registered trademarks. These terms encompass
trade names and service marks as well. A franchise may include the right to use such a mark, but
may include other assets as well. See infra note 77 (discussing definition of "franchise").
56. An asset is considered self-created if it is "produced for the taxpayer by another person
under a contract... entered into prior to the production of the intangible." H.R. CoNF. REP. No.
213, supra note 10, at 684, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1373. Thus, works produced as
"works made for hire" under the copyright laws should be considered "self-created" assets under
§ 197 as long as they remain in the hands of the original copyright owner. See 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1994) (defining "work made for hire"). For the categories of self-created intangibles that are subject
to § 197, see infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
57. Under § 1253, the purchaser of a franchise, trademark, or trade name is allowed a current
deduction for payments contingent on the production, use, or disposition of the asset purchased. See
I.R.C. § 1253(d)(1) (1994). All other amounts paid for the asset are nondeductible, id. § 1253(d)(2),
but are subject to 15-year straight-line depreciation under § 197. I.R.C. § 197(a), (d)(1)(F) (1994).
Other self-created intangibles to which § 197 applies include: certain covenants not to compete,
government licenses and permits, and any intangible created in connection with the acquisition of
a substantial portion of a trade or business. Id. § 197(c)(2), (d)(1)(D), (E).
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acquired; notable examples are goodwill and going concern value."8
Another class of intangibles is subject to section 197 only when the
taxpayer has obtained the assets in the course of acquiring a trade or
business or a "substantial portion thereof."59 If an intangible of this type
is "acquired separately,"'  section 197 does not apply.
This "acquired separately" exception applies to several types of
assets, many of which are closely related to the entertainment indus-
try-notably, "[a]ny interest in a film, sound recording, video tape, book,
or similar property,"'" "[a]ny interest in a patent or copyright,"62 and,
to the extent authorized by future Treasury Regulations, certain
contractual rights that are fixed in amount or endure less than fifteen
years.63 Thus, if any of these interests are acquired separately, the
acquiring party will not be compelled to use fifteen-year straight-line
depreciation.64
The question regarding whether section 197 applies to an acquired
(as opposed to self-created) intangible thus initially depends on the nature
of the intangible-for example, customer lists versus copyrights. For
intangibles covered by the "acquired separately" exception, the determi-
nation then turns on the circumstances of the acquisition-i.e., whether
or not it is separately acquired. For these assets, section 197 applies only
58. To derive a complete list, compare id. § 197(d) (listing all "section 197 intangible[s]") with
id. § 197(e)(4) (listing assets exempt from § 197 when "acquired separately").
59. Id. § 197(e)(4).
60. Id.
61. Id. § 197(e)(4)(A).
62. Id. § 197(e)(4)(C).
63. Id. § 197(e)(4)(D). If implemented, the exception will apply to contractual rights which
have a fixed duration of less than 15 years, or which are fixed as to amount and would otherwise
be subject to recovery under a method similar to the unit-of-production method. Id. No such
regulation has been promulgated at this time. The income forecast method might qualify as a method
similar to the unit-of-production method, which depreciates property according to the rate at which
it is used. See Panhandle E. Pipe Line v. United States, 408 F.2d 690, 716 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (explaining
unit-of-production method); Tax Treatment of Intangible Assets: Hearing on S. 1245, HR. 3035, and
H.R. 4210 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 170 (1992) [hereinafter
Senate Hearings] (statement of Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.) (drawing above analogy
between income forecast method and unit-of-production method). However, it is questionable
whether most depreciable intellectual property rights could be considered "fixed as to amount."
64. With respect to two of these exempt categories-copyrights and contractual rights-§ 167
provides that the depreciation deduction shall be computed in accordance with regulations prescribed
by the Secretary. I.R.C. §167(f)(2) (1994) (as amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13,261(b)(1), 107 Stat. 312, 538). However, there is no similar
provision for the first category-films, sound recordings, etc. This is somewhat confusing, since an
interest in a "film, sound recording, video tape, book, or similar property" by definition includes a
copyright interest, and will often include contractual rights of the kind included in the "acquired
separately" exception. See id. § 197(e)(4)(A) (1994).
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if the assets are acquired as part of a transaction (or a series of related
transactions) in which the taxpayer acquires a "substantial portion" of a
trade or business. Once a transaction is so characterized, all of the
section 197 intangibles acquired in the transaction will be subject to
fifteen-year straight-line depreciation under section 197 because none of
them will be treated as "acquired separately."
This presents two questions, one of interpretation and one of policy.
The interpretation question is how to determine which acquisitions
involve a "substantial portion" of a trade or business. The policy question
is whether, once those transactions are identified, it is appropriate to
apply a different, and usually less generous, depreciation method to
income forecast property simply because it has not been "acquired
separately."
When Congress decided to subject income forecast property, such
as copyrights and patents, to the same treatment as customer lists and
goodwill whenever the intangibles in question are acquired as a
substantial portion of a trade or business, it allowed the goal of tax
simplification to override the goal of matching income and expense. In
order to achieve this simplification, however, Congress, the Treasury, and
ultimately the courts must now address the difficult question of what
constitutes an acquisition of a substantial portion of a trade or business.
As discussed below, in the case of certain types of income forecast
property, this question may be especially controversial. The complexity
of this interpretive problem, combined with the failure of the fifteen-year
straight-line method to match income and expense as accurately as the
income forecast method, raises a serious question as to whether income
forecast property should have been included in section 197 at all.
A. Defining a "Substantial Portion of a Trade or
Business": The Role of Goodwill
Unfortunately, section 197 does not define what constitutes a
"substantial portion" of a trade or business. As discussed below, this
factual determination can be especially problematic any time an acquired
intangible contains certain indicia of goodwill. This problem will tend to
be compounded when the acquisition involves multiple assets, but it can
arise even when only a single asset is acquired-for example, a single
motion picture. Although this ambiguity can arise in connection with any
kind of intangible covered by the "acquired separately" rule, in practice
it is likely to be encountered most often in the case of interests in motion
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pictures, video games, and other entertainment or education-related
properties that contain significant indicia of goodwill.
The legislative history of section 197 offers only general guidance
as to what constitutes a "substantial portion" of a trade or business. To
determine what is a "substantial portion," the Conference Report calls for
a "facts and circumstances" analysis which considers "the nature and
amount of the assets acquired as well as the nature and amount of the
assets retained by the transferor."'65 The Report also offers this guidance
for determining which assets constitute a "trade or business":
[A] group of assets is to constitute a trade or business if the use of
such assets would constitute a trade or business for purposes of section
1060 of the Code (i.e., if the assets are of such a character that
goodwill or going concern value could under any circumstances attach
to the assets). In addition, the acquisition of a franchise, trademark or
trade name is to constitute the acquisition of a trade or business or a
substantial portion of a trade or business.6
The specific reference to franchises, trademarks, and trade names in this
passage is somewhat redundant, since by their nature, these are assets to
which goodwill normally attaches.67 However, this redundancy serves
to underscore Congress's apparent intent to treat any asset acquisition
65. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 10, at 678, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1367.
66. Id; See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-IT(b)(2) (1988) (expanding on the "trade or business"
definition).
67. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1994) (trademark is assignable with goodwill of the business);
Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 495 n.8 (1st Cir. 1981)
(use of another's trade name appropriates "'the reputation, goodwill and value connected with [that]
trade name"' (quoting Great Scott Food Market, Inc. v. Sunderland Wonder, Inc., 203 N.E.2d 376,
379 (Mass. 1965))); Pignons, 657 F.2d at 494 (defining "trademark dilution" as "use of a mark by
the defendant in a way that detracts from, draws on or otherwise appropriates the goodwill and
reputation associated with the plaintiff's mark"); E.F. Prichard Co. v. Consumers Brewing Co., 136
F.2d 512, 519 (6th Cir. 1943) (trademark ownership established where claimant gives merchandise
"the benefits of his name and business style"), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 763 (1944); Montgomery Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 615 F.2d 1318, 1332 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (considering franchise as
repository of goodwill); ABC v. Wahl Co., 36 F. Supp. 167, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (trademark is
deemed abandoned if assigned apart from the goodwill of the business), rev'd on other grounds, 121
F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1941); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 F. 796, 806 (D. Del. 1920)
("Trade-marks and the good will [sic] of a business are inseparable."); Canterbury v. Commissioner,
99 T.C. 223, 252 (1992) ("Trademarks and trade names are the embodiment of goodwill."); Kramer
v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 768, 782 (1983) (referring to goodwill as "inextricably the essence of the
valuable use of a name"); Zomiger v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 435, 444-45 (1974) (similar to
Montgomery Coca-Cola), acq. in result, 1975-1 C.B. 2, and acq. in result, 1975-2 C.B. 3. See
generally 15 JACOB MERTENS, JR., THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 59.58, at 162-63
& n.54 (1994) (collecting cases, and noting that while trademarks and franchises embody goodwill,
they can be separately valued for tax purposes).
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which includes a goodwill component as the acquisition of a "substantial
portion of a trade or business." Thus, for example, the presence of even
a single protectable mark could cause an entire group of acquired assets
to be ineligible for a depreciation method other than that of section 197,
even if, had the mark been excluded from the transfer, the other assets
would have qualified for the "acquired separately" exception.6"
The presence of goodwill does not appear to be essential to finding
that a particular transfer involves a substantial portion of a trade or
business. Thus, even where there is no element of goodwill in the
transaction, it is possible that a multiple asset transfer could fall outside
the "acquired separately" exception. This might be the case, for example,
where none of the taxpayer's purchase price in a transaction can
reasonably be allocated to goodwill-for example, where the taxpayer
acquires all of the assets of a going concern but none of the purchase
price can reasonably be allocated to a trademark, trade name, franchise,
or goodwill,69 perhaps because the business is poorly established or
unsuccessful. If such a transfer includes income forecast property such
as copyrights or patents, this property would become subject to section
197 in the buyer's hands, even if the income forecast method would have
been available to the seller.
However, in many cases the determination of whether the "acquired
separately" exception applies will turn on the presence of goodwill
among the acquired assets. For this issue to arise, it is not strictly
necessary that more than one asset be acquired; if an element of goodwill
is present in the sole asset transferred, then the buyer might be deemed
to have acquired a substantial portion of a trade or business by acquiring
that single asset.7"
68. Intellectual property such as a film often contains one or more protectable marks. As noted
earlier, trademarks and trade names are covered by § 197 even when they are created by the taxpayer
rather than acquired. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. Thus, even where a film is
created rather than acquired by a taxpayer, the presence of trademarks in the film could, at least in
theory, present a problem under § 197. Because trademarks must be depreciated under the § 197
method, but copyrights and film rights are exempt, arguably any film which contains one or more
trademarks (whether acquired or newly created) contains one or more intangibles which are subject
to § 197.
69. See I.R.C. § 1060 (1994) (goveming purchase price allocations for trademarks); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1060-IT (1988) (similar).
70. The House Conference Report notes:
It is anticipated that the Treasury Department will exercise its regulatory authority to
require any intangible property that would otherwise be excluded from the definition of
the term "section 197 intangible" to be taken into account under the bill under
circumstances where the acquisition of the intangible property is, in and of itself, the
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This creates uncertainty for taxpayers acquiring rights in such
entertainment- or education-related products as films, television shows,
toys, books, stories, comic books, musical compositions, games, video
games, and multimedia works. Even a single work of this nature may
include one or more protectable marks, taking the form of fictional
characters (their names and/or appearance), titles,7 catch-phrases (for
example, Yabba-Dabba-Doo; Don't Have a Cow, Man), fictional business
establishments (for example, the Daily Planet, the Lanford Lunchbox) or
locations (for example, the town of Bedrock, the planet Vulcan), and
other devices with sufficient secondary meaning to constitute trademarks
or trade names.72 In addition, the mere fact that an asset such as a film
acquisition of an asset which constitutes a trade or business or a substantial portion of a
trade or business.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 10, at 678, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1367; accord,
H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 997, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 766.
71. Although the title of a single work is generally considered too descriptive to be federally
registered as a trademark, see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1994), registration is allowed for the titles of
serial works and for other titles to the extent that they are used in merchandising. See In re Cooper,
254 F.2d 611, 615-16 (C.C.P.A.) (stating that "the name or title of a book of the literary sort cannot
be a trademark" but noting that series titles and names of periodicals such as magazines and
newspapers have been registered), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840 (1958); Maljack Prods. v. Goodtimes
Home Video Corp., 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1959, 1963 n.12 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (titles to single works
cannot be registered); Salt Water Sportsman, Inc. v. B.A.S.S., Inc., 4 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1407, 1409
(D. Mass. 1987) (noting that magazine titles can be registered) (order entered at 685 F. Supp. 12).
In addition, even if it cannot be federally registered, a title with secondary meaning can qualify for
trademark protection at common law and for similar protection under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994); Tri-Star Pictures v. Leisure Time Prods., B.V., 17 F.3d 38,43 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 484 (1994); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 n.3 (2d Cir. 1989);
Warner Bros. Pictures v. Majestic Pictures Corp., 70 F.2d 310, 311-12 (2d Cir. 1934); Jackson v.
Universal Int'l Pictures, 222 P.2d 433,436 (Cal. 1950); Tomlin v. Walt Disney Prods., 96 Cal. Rptr.
118, 122-23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
72. The terms "trademark" and "trade name" are not defined in § 197. However, the term
"trademark" is also used in § 1253 of the Code. I.R.C. § 1253 (1994). The legislative history of that
section mentions that the definition of that term in § 45 of the Lanham Act "'includes any word,
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or
merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others..'
S. REP. No. 552, supra note 14, at 211 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N at 2246 (reporting
on Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487); see 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994)
(Lanham Act definition of trademark). The 1971 proposed regulations under § 1253 echoed that
definition. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1253-2(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 13,148, 13,151 (1971) (withdrawn by CO-
53-92, 58 Fed. Reg. 25,587, as modified by IRS correction issued March 21, 1994). The proposed
§ 1253 regulations defined "trade name" as "any name used by a manufacturer or merchant to
identify or designate a particular trade or business or the name or title lawfully adopted and used by
a person or organization engaged in a trade or business." Id. § 1.1253-2(c), 36 Fed. Reg. at 13,151.
Because the determination of whether a particular device has an origin-identifying function
("secondary meaning") turns on all the facts and circumstances--notably public perception-it will
not always be clear whether, at the time of acquisition, the property in question contains any
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is associated with a major "name" such as a well-known writer, star, or
director may cause goodwill to attach to the asset.73 Thus, if the
Conference Report reflects the correct interpretation of the "acquired
separately" provisions, a party that acquires the rights to even a single
film (or similar asset) that contains some goodwill components could be
treated as acquiring an asset to which section 197 applies. Indeed, it is
not strictly necessary that the goodwill component be present at the time
of the acquisition; according to the Conference Report, it is enough that
goodwill could "under any circumstances" attach to the asset.74 This
trademarks. If a particular device obtains its secondary meaning after the acquisition takes place, then
it is not a trademark at the time of the acquisition. But see infra note 74 and accompanying text
(noting possibility that § 197 could apply even where goodwill has not yet attached to an asset at
the time of its acquisition).
73. An example would be the acquisition of film adaptation rights to a story by John Grisham
or Stephen King, or the acquisition of rights in the completed film. The mere association with a
well-known writer can be a virtual guarantee of future patronage, which is a widely-used definition
of goodwill. See, e.g., Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1683-84
(1993) (collecting cases) (Souter, J., dissenting); Silverton v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 817,
833-34 (1977) (citing additional Tax Court cases), affd without opinion, 647 F.2d 172 (9th Cir.)
(Table), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1033 (1981); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 10, at 674,
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1363; H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 762; S. REP No. 36,
supra note 41, at 219. This would be a mere license rather than an acquisition of all rights to a
trademark or trade name, since the buyer would not hold the permanent and exclusive right to use
the name in question. However, the association with a well-known name would ensure that goodwill
would attach, and in this context, § 197 does not appear to distinguish between licenses and
ownership transfers.
74. See supra notes 66, 70 and accompanying text; see also ABA Section of Taxation,
Comments Concerning Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Under Section 197 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, reprinted in 95 TAx NOTES TODAY 16-26 (Jan. 25, 1995) (noting concerns
raised by the "under any circumstances" language).
It should be noted that a taxpayer acquiring an interest in a film or similar property
containing trademarks or trade names frequently does not "acquire" the marks themselves, but only
a license to exploit them. For example, one who purchases all rights to a film with which Stephen
King is associated does not own Stephen King's name, but typically owns a license to use that name
in exploiting the film. In other cases, however, the acquirer of a film might obtain, as part of the
deal, exclusive ownership of some of the marks contained in the flil--for example, the name and/or
likeness of a distinctive character such as R2D2 in "Star Wars."
A taxpayer may acquire an interest in a § 197 intangible which is something less than full
ownership of the intangible. The "acquired separately" exception clearly applies to separate
acquisitions of "[a]ny interest in a film, sound recording, video tape, book, or similar property,"
I.R.C. § 197(e)(4)(A) (1994), and "[a]ny interest in a patent or copyright," id. § 197(e)(4)(C).
However, the provisions defining a "section 197 intangible" refer simply to "any franchise,
trademark, or trade name," without distinguishing between ownership of the entire intangible and
ownership of a partial interest in the intangible, such as a license (exclusive or nonexclusive). Id.
§ 197(d)(l)(F). A license to use a trademark is not ownership of the mark itself. However, it is
possible that a license may itself be a "substantial portion" of a trade or business. See H.R. CONF.
REP. NO. 213, supra note 10, at 684, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1369. Section 197 does not
define "acquisition" of a franchise, trademark, or trade name. The term might apply only to a true
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provision is so sweeping that virtually no entertainment related property
would be excluded.
Neither section 197 nor its legislative history addresses this
problem. The statute expressly exempts "[a]ny interest in a film... or
similar property" when it is "acquired separately. 7 5 However, the
Conference Report appears to preclude "acquired separately" treatment
for acquisitions that include any form of goodwill. If this interpretation
accurately reflects congressional intent, then section 197 will apply to a
wide variety of acquired intellectual property rights, especially in
entertainment-related products. Indeed, many of these are acquired
precisely because they have proven their market appeal-that is, because
they include a substantial goodwill component. The goodwill component
may generate substantial merchandising revenues. In some cases, the
exhibition revenues generated by the property will still represent the most
substantial part of its value, and the merchandising component will be
incidental-for example, where a "name" performer appears in the
picture, or the film contains distinctive and memorable features, such as
fictional characters or locations-while in others, the merchandising
revenues generated by the asset may represent a more significant
component of the asset's total revenue stream-for example, where
particular characters (especially cartoon characters) are highly merchan-
disable.76
sale or exchange, rather than a mere license. See I.R.C. § 1253(a) (1994). In contrast, if the term
applies to the acquisition of any interest in such intangibles, then, for example, § 197 could apply
to an acquisition of an interest in any film to which a distinctive character or a "name" writer,
performer, director, or producer is attached. In fact, this appears to be the better interpretation. An
interest in a franchise, as defined in sections 197(f)(4)(A) and 1253(b)(1), see infra note 77, can be
nonexclusive. Nothing indicates that Congress intended a sticker definition for an interest in a
trademark.
Whether a trademark has been acquired will depend on the nature of the rights transferred.
If one party sells the rights to exploit an animated film but retains the exclusive right to use one of
its characters as a trademark, then the transferred rights with respect to that character would
constitute a copyright interest rather than ownership of a trademark.
75. It would appear that the specific exception for "[a]ny interest in a film.., or similar
property" that is acquired separately, I.R.C. § 197(e)(4)(A) (1994) should override the more general
provision governing trademarks, franchises, and trade names. Id. § 197(d)(l)(F). If not, then even
in the case of a self-created film, the taxpayer would have to allocate a portion of the film's
production costs to the film's trademarks and depreciate those costs under the § 197 rules.
76. In some cases, a taxpayer may acquire an entertainment-related product as much for its
goodwill as for its creative or literary component. In such a case, the taxpayer appears to be
acquiring an asset that consists largely of goodwill and/or trademarks, rather than property eligible
for income forecast depreciation. Recall that merchandising income is entirely excluded from the
income forecast calculation. See supra note 29. Where merchandising revenue is substantial, its
exclusion from the formula may undermine the capacity of the income forecast method to match
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By creating an exception for interests in individual films or similar
copyright-based properties that are "acquired separately," Congress
signaled an intent to preserve the income forecast method (or shorter
recovery periods in general, as in the case where a taxpayer opts for the
straight-line method but can demonstrate a useful life of less than fifteen
years). Yet Congress has provided no guidance for determining which of
these goodwill-containing properties should be treated as "acquired
separately" and therefore exempt from section 197.77 If Congress indeed
income and expense. As discussed below, this problem might be resolved in a number of ways.
The first solution would be to differentiate between entertainment-related properties which
are largely vehicles for goodwill (for example, films which are likely to produce merchandising
revenues which are substantial in relation to their exhibition revenues) and properties which will
generate most of their revenues through exploitation of their copyrights (for example, films likely
to generate exhibition revenues far greater than their merchandising revenues). This distinction,
however, could be difficult to apply in practice.
A second solution would be to amend § 197 to subject any interest in a copyright to 15-year
straight-line depreciation. This would eliminate the need to distinguish between the goodwill and
literary components of a motion picture, thus advancing the goal of simplification. In many if not
most cases, this approach would do a poor job of matching income and expense. However, § 197
already has that effect on copyrights that are not "acquired separately," and the current rules
necessitate a complex analysis whenever goodwill components are associated with a copyrighted
work.
A third solution would be to change the income forecast calculation to treat merchandising
income like exhibition income, thus requiring taxpayers to include projected merchandising income
in the denominator, and actual merchandising income in the numerator. This solution would improve
the accuracy of the income forecast method, thus strengthening the argument for excluding income
forecast property such as motion pictures from § 197. This solution appears to exempt from § 197
an asset which is the equivalent of a trademark or goodwill. That result should not cause great
concern, however, since unlike trademarks of the more traditional sort which typically have indefinite
useful lives, the useful life of a film's merchandisable components is likely to parallel fairly closely
the useful life of the film's copyright. In other words, during periods when a film is not being
exhibited (and thus not producing any exhibition income), it is not likely to produce much
merchandising income. What child wants a "Batman" lunch box when all her friends talk about is
"The Lion King"? In some cases, a film's embedded trademarks might outlast all of the copyrights
in which they were embedded (including sequels, spin-offs, and other new works), but those cases
would be the exception rather than the rule. Under this approach, there should be no need to allocate
any portion of a film's basis to its goodwill components and subject that basis to 15-year straight-
line depreciation; the income forecast method should produce a clear reflection of income with
respect to the entire basis.
77. The use of the term "franchise" in the House Conference Report language defining a
"substantial portion" of a trade or business is itself problematic. Section 197(f)(4)(A) defines
"franchise" by reference to § 1253(b)(1), where it is defined to include "an agreement which gives
one of the parties to the agreement the right to distribute, sell, or provide goods, services, or
facilities, within a specified area." I.R.C. § 1253(b)(1) (1994); H.R. CONE. REP. NO. 213, supra note
10, at 677, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1366; see Jefferson-Pilot Corp. v. Commissioner, 98
T.C. 435, 440-46 (1992) (discussing definition of "franchise" and applying the term to an FCC
license), affd, 995 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1993). An interest in a film that is less than full ownership
of the film's copyright could easily constitute a "franchise" under this definition---typically, for
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meant to exempt all individually-acquired motion pictures and similar
properties, then section 197 will allow many taxpayers to subject
lucrative trademarks to income forecast depreciation whenever those
trademarks are embedded in a motion picture or other income forecast
property. In most cases, this will allow taxpayers to depreciate the
trademarks much more rapidly than the fifteen-year straight-line method
would allow.
If embedded trademarks are exempt from section 197, while
separately acquired trademarks are not, then the taxpayer acquiring the
larger bundle of intangibles (the entire motion picture) is entitled to a
more favorable depreciation method for the trademarks included in that
bundle than the taxpayer acquiring a trademark by itself. For example,
a taxpayer acquiring all rights to the film The Lion King would be able
to subject the entire acquisition cost to income forecast depreciation,
while a taxpayer acquiring only the right to merchandise the film's
"Simba" character would be treated as acquiring a trademark right, and
thus could be required to depreciate that right under the fifteen-year
straight-line method.7" Yet the second taxpayer has acquired only one
right (which may exhaust the largest part of its income-generating
potential within a few years), whereas the first taxpayer has acquired a
much larger bundle of rights, one that merely includes the trademark
right among many others. In most situations, the "acquired separately"
provisions of section 197 offer the acquiring taxpayer more rapid
depreciation of individually acquired assets. In the case of embedded
trademarks, however, these provisions can lead to the opposite result.
The reason for this perverse result is that motion pictures, as well
example, one party acquires the exclusive right to distribute the film or other entertainment product
in a particular geographic area. Thus, the acquirer of the film rights in a particular geographic area
might be unable to invoke the "acquired separately" provisions of § 197 to avoid the 15-year
depreciation rule. It is not clear, however, whether Congress intended the same result where a license
is not geographically limited-for example, where a party acquires a perpetual nonexclusive license,
such as the right to use an actor's name in promoting and exploiting a film, without geographic
restrictions.
However, the legislative history of § 197 indicates that the exclusion for separately acquired
interests in films, sound recordings, videotapes, books, and similar properties includes an interest as
a licensee (including a right to broadcast or transmit a live event). H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra
note 10, at 680, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1369. This suggests that Congress intended the
term "franchise" to be narrowly construed in this context to exclude licenses in these entertainment-
related products.
78. Even if the merchandising right were limited by contract to a period of less than 15 years,
the presence of goodwill would probably place merchandising transactions beyond the scope of any
regulatory exception for such short-term contracts. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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as many other types of intellectual property (typically those related to
entertainment, and sometimes education), represent not a single asset but
a bundle of assets. In addition to the bundle of rights constituting a
copyright, such a work frequently includes rights in the nature of a
trademark. The embedded trademarks may already have acquired their
trademark character at the time the film is acquired, or else they may
acquire that character after the acquisition takes place, depending on
when they begin to perform an origin-identifying function. The origin-
identifying function of these embedded trademarks has a value separate
from the value of their function within the copyrighted work. However,
section 197 does not recognize that value.79 As a result, films and
similar works appear to qualify for the "acquired separately" exception
regardless of the merchandising potential of their embedded trademarks.
Thus, a taxpayer interested in merchandising a film's trademarks for an
indefinite period of time would be well advised to frame the acquisition
as a license to use the motion picture itself rather than merely one of its
embedded trademarks.
A second ambiguity in section 197 comes into play whenever a
party acquires rights not in an individual motion picture or similar asset,
but in a larger grouping that includes at least one such asset-for
example, a television series, a film library, or a music publisher's song
catalog. Not only is it more likely that such a transfer includes at least
one trademark, trade name, or other component of goodwill, but
according to the Conference Report, the larger the number of assets
transferred, the more likely they will be viewed as a substantial portion
of a trade or business even without finding the presence of a trademark,
trade name, or other goodwill component."0 Thus, virtually any transfer
of rights in multiple films or other copyrighted works, regardless of
79. The IRS itself drew this distinction in the 1979 memorandum in which it determined that
merchandising revenues should be excluded from the income forecast calculation because those
revenues were unrelated to the copyright interest acquired or produced by the taxpayer. There,
however, it concluded that none of a film's production costs should be allocated to the film's
merchandising revenues for depreciation purposes. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 79-18-012 (Jan. 24, 1979).
Thus, whether the work is self-created or acquired, the presence of trademarks in a copyrighted work
is disregarded for depreciation purposes.
80. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 213, supra note 10, at 678-79, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 1367-68; supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (discussing Conference Report definitions of
"substantial portion" and "trade or business" and the attachment of goodwill thereto). This problem
could arise even where a taxpayer acquires films that have not yet been released. Regardless of
whether any individual film contained indicia of goodwill, the group of films could be viewed either
as several discrete acquisitions (in which case the films would be "acquired separately") or as a
substantial portion of the seller's trade or business (in which case § 197 would apply).
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whether they contain goodwill components, has the potential to force the
purchaser to apply the fifteen-year straight-line method rather than the
income forecast method,"1 even if the latter would have been available
had the assets been separately acquired. 2
These interpretive problems could also arise outside the copyright
context. For example, a taxpayer might acquire the right to exploit a
patented invention, together with the right to use a trademark or trade
name associated with the invention. In some cases, it has been suggested
that the acquisition of a patent right alone might constitute a substantial
portion of a trade or business under section 197, even without the
acquisition of a trademark or franchise. 3
These questions must be answered before section 197 can accom-
plish its simplification purpose. They do not appear susceptible to easy
resolution. Rather than achieve its goal of eliminating controversy, the
enactment of section 197 may simply shift the focus of the controversy
from identifying the useful life of an acquired asset to determining
whether it represents a substantial portion of a trade or business.
Even in cases where the transferred assets clearly constitute a
substantial portion of a trade or business, the question remains whether
it makes sense, from a policy perspective, to foreclose the income
forecast method based on the manner of the acquisition. This rule has
two distortive effects: First, it alters the total recovery period for any
asset which reaches the end of its useful life well before or after the
fifteen-year recovery period expires. Second, it allocates
disproportionately small amounts of depreciation to time periods when
an asset may be generating the largest portion of its revenue stream, and
disproportionately large amounts of depreciation to time periods when an
asset may generate little or no income.84
The first objection applies equally to many assets which are
ineligible for the income forecast method, since section 197 requires a
taxpayer to use the fifteen-year straight-line method for many intangibles
81. It could also supplant the shorter recovery period available under the straight-line method
for assets with useful lives of less than 15 years.
82. See supra note 63 (discussing possible regulatory exclusion for separately acquired
contracts fixed as to amount or enduring less than 15 years).
83. See Douglass, supra note 9, at 759-60.
84. For example, a motion picture may be released for a short period of time, then withheld
from exhibition in order to build up demand for its re-release, which may take place in a later
taxable year.
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which have remaining useful lives of less than fifteen years."5 Congress
was clearly aware of this effect when it enacted section 197.86 However,
the second of these effects-shifting the timing of depreciation deduc-
tions within the recovery period-is largely limited to income forecast
property, since most other intangibles would be depreciated under the
straight-line method even if section 197 did not apply to them.87
The background and legislative history of section 197, as well as the
statutory language itself, indicate that interests in copyrights, patents, and
other property for which the income forecast method is appropriate were
not the target of that legislation. Rather, Congress enacted section 197 to
end the longstanding controversy over the depreciability of certain types
of acquired intangibles, the useful life of which was either unlimited or
difficult to ascertain-notably, goodwill, going concern value, and certain
intangibles closely related thereto, such as customer lists.8 Income
forecast property had not historically generated controversy of this
type.89 In fact, the exception for separately acquired interests in films,
sound recordings, videotapes, books, or similar property was created in
response to the film industry's argument that, because the income
forecast method applied to such creative property, the useful life question
was simply irrelevant.90 Congress was simply not presented with any
evidence that the income forecast method creates a significant risk that
85. For example, a three-year covenant not to compete would have a useful life of only three
years, but still would be subject to the 15-year straight-line method. Similarly, a customer list might
lose its value in less than 15 years.
In the case of a patent or copyright, the remaining useful life could be less than 15 years for
any of several reasons: (I) the statutory term of the patent or copyright may be expiring; (2) the
useful life of the patent or copyright may be shorter than its statutory term; or (3) the taxpayer may
have acquired a license to use the property for a period of time shorter than its useful life or its
statutory term.
86. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 10, at 35 (statement of Kenneth W. Gideon,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy).
87. See, e.g., id. at 382-88 (statement of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.).
88. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
89. See DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSALS, supra note I I, at 6-14 (collecting cases illustrating these
controversies, none of which involved property which derived its value from patents or copyrights).
90. In hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee, Congressman Michael A.
Andrews noted the industry's concern that "the bill may cover the acquirer of film and film
distribution rights even though those transactions are not part of the problem that H.R. 3035 is
intended to correct." House Hearings, supra note 10, at 86. The Treasury's response was
noncommittal: "[S]ome of the industry's fears about the coverage of the bill are misplaced, while
in other cases the industry has raised legitimate concerns." Id. (response of Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury for Tax Policy Kenneth W. Gideon to question from Congressman Andrews); see id.
at 382-88 (statement of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.); Senate Hearings, supra
note 63, at 169-73 (statement of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.).
1995]
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the intangibles to which it applies will be depreciated over too short a
period of time, because the useful life of such intangibles is based upon
the income generated, not the passage of time.
However, the exception created by Congress for assets that are
"acquired separately" does not go far enough and is not delineated
clearly enough. The rulings authorizing the income forecast method
repeatedly stress the importance of matching income and expense, and
the appropriateness of the income forecast method in achieving that
goal.9' Yet if section 197 is allowed to foreclose income forecast
depreciation in situations where the latter method produces a clearer
reflection of income, the goal of tax simplification will have been
achieved at the expense of the matching principle.92
The distortion introduced by section 197 is particularly acute when
a taxpayer acquires a group of assets that includes some income forecast
property which the taxpayer does not immediately exploit. This
91. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text. It may be that in some instances the income
forecast method does not produce a clear reflection of income. For example, a taxpayer may
deliberately underestimate an asset's future income stream in order to front-load depreciation
deductions. However, the case law and rulings provide no evidence of such practices, and nothing
in the legislative history of § 197 indicates that Congress was concerned about this possibility.
Any problems which impair the ability of the income forecast method to produce a clear
reflection of income should be corrected by addressing the operation of the method itself-for all
assets to which it applies-rather than by preserving the status quo for separately acquired assets and
eliminating the method entirely for all others.
92. A 1991 study by the Congressional Research Service supports this assessment, and goes
a step further, suggesting that any intangibles with non-expensable creation costs (thus excluding
goodwill, for example) should be depreciated over their useful lives rather than subjected to the
uniform depreciation method of § 197:
Despite assertions to the contrary, the choice of a uniform amortization
period ... turns out to provide the same effective tax rate for all intangibles, at least for
assets purchased as part of an ongoing business. Neither economic efficiency nor tax
equity require that separate amortization periods be ascribed to purchased intangibles
depending on their degree of wasting away. The argument that tax lives should
correspond to economic lives in this case has not been derived from a rigorous economic
analysis, but rather has been based on reasoning by analogy with tangible assets. That
reasoning is flawed because it does not take into account the expensing of created
intangibles. Assets that deteriorate are replaced by new expenditures that are eligible for
such expensing.
This analysis does not, however, apply to those intangible assets that are normally
produced for sale (such as some computer software) or assets that are capitalized (such
as movies). To properly measure income of these assets requires writing them off over
their useful lives.
Gravelle & Taylor, supra note 12, at Summary (unpaginated); id. at CRS-2, CRS-7, CRS-12. The
same report also implies that a uniform amortization period is not appropriate for assets that are
capable of being sold separately from an ongoing business (in other words, assets clearly
distinguishable from goodwill and going concern value). Id. at CRS-5, CRS-12.
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commonly occurs, for example, where a taxpayer acquires a film library
or music catalog, exploits some of the works immediately, but retains
others for future use and decides not to exploit others at all (or at least
not within the foreseeable future). If the taxpayer is treated as having
acquired a substantial portion of a trade or business so that section 197
applies, then all of the acquired intangibles immediately become subject
to mandatory fifteen-year straight-line depreciation. 93 This front-loading
of depreciation provides a windfall to the taxpayer with respect to any
intangibles that are not being exploited during the current taxable period.
In contrast, most taxpayers acquiring goodwill, customer lists, going
concern value, and similar intangibles will be eager to exploit those
assets quickly, before their revenue potential diminishes. A key
difference between these intangibles and income forecast property is that
a delay in exploiting the revenue potential of income forecast property
does not necessarily coincide with a diminution in its value. In some
cases, such as the re-release of a classic film after the owner has
withheld it for several years in order to build up consumer demand, the
revenue potential of the property may actually increase during the period
of non-use.
In enacting section 197, Congress chose a broad-brush approach to
the problem of depreciating intangibles. Yet Congress need not have
adopted a uniform rule for all intangibles not "acquired separately."
Instead, it could have separated intangibles into classes, and treated each
class differently according to its characteristics. Each class could have
been assigned a predetermined useful life (as under section 168 for
tangible property)94 or a particular methodology for determining its
useful life-for example, the income forecast method, where appropriate.
Goodwill and customer lists might have been placed in the same class,
for example, if Congress wished to apply the same depreciation rules to
both types of property. Property which a taxpayer elects to depreciate
under the income forecast method could then have been placed in a
separate class.
Although Congress considered other alternatives, 95 it selected the
93. Compare I.R.C. § 197(a) (1994) with id. § 197(e)(4).
94. I.R.C. § 168 (1994).
95. Congress considered several alternatives to the approach of § 197. One of these would
have allowed taxpayers to amortize customer-based, market share, and similar intangibles over their
useful life if the taxpayer could establish that they had a limited useful life and a value separate from
goodwill, going concern value, and any other assets acquired in the same transaction. The Treasury
would have been authorized to:
promulgate regulations establishing safe harbor recovery periods that are consistent with
1995]
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approach embodied in section 197 because it had the virtue of simplici-
ty96 Without a doubt, simplicity is a laudable goal in any revision of
the tax laws. However, eliminating income forecast depreciation for an
otherwise eligible asset simply because some goodwill attaches (or might
"under any circumstances" attach) to that asset, or to any other assets
transferred in the same transaction, represents a "solution" that exceeds
the scope of the problem.
There are three reasons why income forecast property could be
excluded from section 197 without reintroducing undue complexity into
the system. First, no useful life need be established for income forecast
property, because the depreciation schedule is dictated by the actual
income-generating performance of the property. Second, the categories
of assets eligible for the income forecast method are clearly delineated
by case law and rulings, and are not, in most cases, 97 easily confused
with intangibles that are non-income forecast property." Third, income
forecast property can be more readily valued than the types of assets that
industry practice and experience for specific types of customer based, market share, and
any similar intangible items, and regulations concerning the manner in which such
intangible items may be valued separately and distinctly from other assets (including
goodwill and going concern value).
DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at 29.
Another alternative Congress considered was to disallow all depreciation for customer base,
market share, or similar intangibles lacking a determinate useful life, including:
customer and subscription lists; patient or other records; the existing "core" deposits of
banks; insurance in force in the case of an insurance company; advertising relationships
and customer or circulation base in the case of a broadcast, cable, newspaper, cellular,
or any other business; other contracts or relationships reflecting the value of the customer
base; location advantage; workforce in place; and market share.
Id. Neither of these alternatives would have altered the pre-§ 197 rules for depreciating income
forecast property such as patents and copyrights.
96. See House Hearings, supra note 10, at 29,33 (statement of Kenneth W. Gideon, Assistant
Secretary (Tax Policy) Department of the Treasury); id. at 75-88 (statement of Jennie S. Stathis,
Director for Tax Policy and Administration Issues, General Government Division, U.S. General
Accounting Office) (discussing GAO proposal for multiple amortization periods for individually
acquired assets); id. at 91, 93 (Testimony of Peter L. Faber on behalf of the American Bar
Association); id. at 100, 101 (statement of Leonard Podolin, Chairman of the Tax Executive
Committee of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants); GAO REPORT, supra note 12,
at 39.
97. Although some films may be acquired largely for their merchandising potential, see supra
note 76 and accompanying text, this is as much an issue for separately acquired films as for films
acquired in trade or business transaction, and it could be addressed by revising the income forecast
formula as suggested in, supra, note 76.
98. Although, as discussed earlier, income forecast property can become imbued with goodwill
as a result of its success in the marketplace, at the time it is created it is an asset distinct from
goodwill and going concern value. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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have generated the most controversy-for example, customer lists, core
deposits, and covenants not to compete--because there is normally an
active market for income forecast property.99 Although there may
inevitably be trademarks or other indicia of goodwill present in the
creative work itself, income forecast property, such as patents and
copyrights, is readily and frequently transferred from one party to another
without transferring a substantial portion of any trade or business. In
contrast, it is difficult to identify an income stream separately attributable
to intangibles that are more closely intertwined with the ongoing
operation of a business, such as customer lists and covenants not to
compete. The significance of these differences between income forecast
property and other section 197 intangibles is evidenced by the fact that
none of the reported tax controversies which led Congress to adopt
section 197 involved income forecast property.
V. CONCLUSION
In enacting section 197, Congress elevated tax simplification over
the matching principle. However, the "acquired separately" exception
undermines the simplification goal by reintroducing difficult line-drawing
problems whenever multiple assets are acquired. In addition, even when
a taxpayer acquires an individual intangible asset, in the case of many
types of intellectual property, the actual or even potential presence of
goodwill components in the bundle of rights acquired by the taxpayer
may trigger section 197. Taxpayers currently have no clear guidelines for
determining whether section 197 will apply in such situations. Either
Congress or the Treasury should act quickly to provide the needed
clarification.
One solution which Congress should consider is to remove income
forecast property from the scope of section 197, regardless of whether the
property is "acquired separately" within the meaning of the statute. That
is, section 197 would not apply to any intangible which is eligible for
income forecast depreciation, and which the acquiring taxpayer in fact
depreciates under that method. Although under this approach it would
once again be necessary to establish the value of the intangible, income
forecast property is relatively easy to distinguish from other intangibles,
and is easier to value than goodwill or its close equivalents such as
99. See supra note 92 (discussing a study that distinguishes goodwill and similar intangibles
from those intangibles capable of being sold separately from an ongoing business).
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trademarks and customer lists.'00 The burden of conducting this valua-
tion should also be weighed against the goal of producing a clear
reflection of income, the very goal which has led the Treasury in the past
to embrace the income forecast method.
100. In addition, § 197 does not entirely eliminate the need for separate valuations of acquired
assets in the first place, since separate asset valuations will be necessary to establish an asset's cost
basis if the buyer subsequently disposes of that asset. See I.I.C. § 1060(a).
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